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Patents, the Paris Convention and Less Developed Countries 
Jorge M. Katz* 
Introduction 
Human beings live surrounded by institutions that they dimly under.­
stand, and that they control only in an imperfect manner. It should not, 
therefore, come as a surprise that, when one carefully examines the perfor­
mance of a particular institution, one normally finds unfulfillment of objec­
tives, inefficiency, and social costs that frequently exceed the sum of 
benefits involved. 
The reasons why an institution fails to operate adequately are not, 
in general, easy to identify, and even less, to correct. In some instances 
trouble may arise from an inadequate definition of the objectives the insti­
tution should accomplish. In other instances, an increasing gap may develop 
between the initial goals 1drawn in relation to a given set of conditions--and 
the changing socio-economic framework in which the institution has to operate 
through time. Obviously, the list of reasons can be extended, as any handbook 
on institutional psycho-sociology could teach us. In spite of malfunctions 
*The author works for the Center for Economic Research (Centro de In­
vestigaciones Econ6micas) of the DiTella Institute, Buenos Aires, Argentina. 
He is currently a visiting fellow in the Economic Growth Center of Yale 
University. 
In this monograph statistical materials are used which were compiled 
with the aid of D. Chudnovsky ands. Glemboki, whose dedication is here acknow­
ledged. The study has received financial support from the DiTella Institute 
and the S.S.R.C. of the United States. The translation from Spanish into 
English is the work of Cesar Cardozo. 
The author also wishes to thank the stimulus and connnentaries of 
·M. Wionzcek, M.A. Laquis, A. Orol and A. Canitrot. 
The present version incorporates ideas and materials that arose during 
seminars at Yale and Harvard. The collaboration of those who attended these 
seminars is acknowledged. 
The opinions here expressed are the author's responsibility, and do not 
compromise any of the other persons and institutions nan1ed before. 
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and inefficiencies, however, every institution ends up benefiting certain 
groups in society (at the very least its own administrative bureaucracy), 
groups which, by definition, become vehement defenders of the prevailing 
practices and perennial opposers to the introduction of significant changes 
in the rules of the game. 
A clear example of a situation of this sort is to be found in connec­
tion with the Patent System, and its juridical counterpart at the inter­
national level, the Paris Convention of 1883, with its host of additions and 
changes agreed at in Washington, Brussels, Lisbon, etc. 
Both these institutions are part of the complex mechanism which re­
gulates property rights on the output of inventive activity, the first at a 
national level, and the second in the international scene. 
Both the Patent System and the 1883 Paris Agreement are long standing 
juridical institutions. Both had their origin in countries which now belong 
to the developed world, and they were eventually transplanted to less developed 
societies, on the assumption that what was good for the former necessarily 
had to be good for the latter. 
Such an assumption will be critically examined in this paper. The 
balance of costs and benefits arising from both institutions has to be re­
examined in the light of the economic and technological features of the so­
called "developing" countries, before we can rightfully state that the trans­
plant can be justified. The general case here examined is the one of a 
country that: (a) imports most of its technology from abroad; (b) utilizes 
technology that is normally lagged between five and twenty years when compared 
with "best-practice" designs currently used in developed countries, (c) is 
not particularly suited to contribute to the advancement of the international 
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technological frontier, and (d) is not specialized in the export of industrial 
goods. Such conditions strongly differ from the ones that prevail in the ad­
vanced countries. For this reason we strongly suspect the validity and use­
fulness of contemporary writings in this area, which are based on the condi­
tions prevailing in the developed world and pretend to reach normative con­
clusions to be followed by less developed societies. 
This paper explores the operation of the Patent System in a technolo­
gically dependent country, under the assumption that it con -
stitutes an instrument of government policy. We shall try to answer the 
following questions, which seem crucial in this field: (1) should a tech­
nologically dependent country maintain a domestic Patent System? (2) If so, 
which characteristics should that System have in order to maximize that 
country's welfare position? (3) Is it convenient, or is it not, for that 
country to belong to the International Agreement on the Protection of Indus­
trial Property Rights (Paris Convention)? 
Even though this paper contains information regarding several Latin 
American countries, its central argument has been built around the experience 
of Argentina, a case which is herein examined in detail during the post-war 
period. 
The paper is divided in three parts. The First Part (Sections One to 
Four) reviews the various arguments that have been historically used in order 
to justify the need of a Patent System at the level of an individual country. 
The Second Part (Sections Five to Seven) examines the empirical evidence re­
lated to the operation of the Patent System in Argentina over the last few 
decades. Finally, the Third Part (Section Eight) sunnnarizes the various 
findings of this exploration, advances an answer to the various questions pre­
viously posed, and briefly mentions possible lines of future action. 
-' 
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1. Economic and Non-Economic Arguments used to Justify the Need of Patent Rights 
Even though the Patent System dates back to early stages of history-­
it can be traced back, for example, in the early codes of the Fifteenth Cen­
tury's Venetian Republique--there is agreement that the 1623 Statute of Mono­
polies of Great Britain is the piece of legislation that has served as a model 
for most of the laws currently prevailing in western countries. 1 
Five different arguments have been used to justify the need of a Patent 
System; three of them are arguments of an economic nature, whereas the other 
two are cast in terms of rights inherent to the human being. 
1.1. Rights Inherent to the Human Being 
While the first argument stresses the individual's property rights on 
his own ideas, the second argument emphasizes the right to an 'Adequate Re­
tribution' for the services rendered to society. 
(a) We shall not discuss here whether or not the property right is 
inherent to the human being, or whether it is a social arrangement that serves 
socia. 1 purposes. 2 However, it is worth observing that, even if we conceded 
that the individual has natural property rights on his ideas before connnuni­
cating them to other people, it is very different to argue that these rights 
can still be claimed after the individual's ideas are shared with others. In 
such case the ideas become connnon property. 
1Th ..e spirit of the 1623 English Act can be found in the French Legis­
lation of 1791. It is important to note that the 1864 Argentine Law on
Patents follows the French model. The same is true of some other codes in
Latin America. 
2see the discussion by M. A. Laquis and others in "Sohre la Teoria
del Derecho Sujetivo," "Juridica," Journal of the Law School of the
"Universidad Iberoamericana," Bs.As. 1970. 
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(b) A second non-economic argument rests on the moral rights of the 
inventor to be compensated for the services rendered to society. It was 
stated by J. S. Mill in the following terms: 
"The idea that the inventor should be adequately compensated 
can not be rejected. It would be innnoral that the law 
permitted someone to benefit from some other's work, without 
his approval and a fair compensation. 111 
Also this ar~ument is far from being trouble-free. First, it 
supposes that whoever patents an invention is really the one who conceived 
the original idea. On the one hand, this is not always true, and often 
leads to injustices, as can be appreciated from the following case, 
conunented by F. M. Scherer in a recent work: 
"An exam.ple--of the difficulty in identifying the original 
inventor--, can be found in the dispute about the Lasser 
rays. In this case, a graduate student, unaware of the 
complicated'procedures that must be followed in order to 
obtain a patent, lost his priority against the Nobel Prize 
winner Charles H. Townes, and the Bell Telephone physicist 
Arthur Schawlow, even though the graduate student seems to 
have been the one who first perceived the correct solution 
to the problem. 11 2 
On the other hand, it often happens that it is not just one individual 
who happens to be exploring a certain territory and thus it is somewhat unfair 
that the one who first gets the adequate solution collects the lot of the 
benefits involved. 
1J. s. Mill, "Principles of Political Economy," cited in E. Penrose 
and F. Machlup, "The Patent Controversy in the XIX Century," Journal of 
Economic History (May 1950). 
2F.M. Scherer, Industrial Market Structure and Economic Performance, 
Rand McNally, Chicago, 1971, p. 394. 
Section G of the American Patents Code mentions three different, and 
potentially conflicting forms in which priority conflicts can be resolved; 
these are: (a) date of conception; (b) date in which the solution was put into 
practice, and (c) readiness of the one who conceived the idea in putting it 
to practice. 
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Second, even admitting that the inventor must be compensated, the 
argument does not necessarily imply the needs of protection by means of a 
patent system. It has to be shown-by means of a cost-benefit analysis­
that a patent system is the best possible policy instrument, as there are 
. . ·1 a lternatives to 1. t. 
We shall not deal any longer with the non-economic arguments fior the 
granting of patents. It is the central theme of this paper that the 
Patent System should be considered as an instrument of economic policy. 
Thus, the economic arguments in favor of the granting of patents deserve 
careful examination. 
1.2. Patents as an InstrumPnt of Economic Policy 
There are three different arguments in this respect: (a) patents 
as an incentive to inventive work; (b) as an incentive to technological 
innovation, and (c) as an incentive for inventors to disclosure their inven­
tions. We shall now examine each of these arguments. 
(a) Patents as an Incentive to Inventive Activity. 
The production of technical and scientific knowledge is one among 
the very many productive activities carried up by human beings. Unlike 
other productive activities, however, this one is difficult to explore in 
terms of the analytical tools of received theory. Technological knowledge 
as a tradable good has some features that make it a very special collllllodity. 
On the one hand, it is a colillllodity whose production function presumably 
1See S. Stepanov, "Increasing the Role of Innovators and Inventors 
in Socialist Production," in Problems of Economics, 1958. 
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exhibits both technological "indivisibilities" and scale economies. On the 
other hand, it belongs to the group of the so-called "public goods. 11 This 
last attribute gives rise to II inappropriability" problems, i.e. the marginal 
cost of imitation is substantially lower than the cost of the original dis-
covery. 
Given both such features, we have to expect that, first: the expendi-
tures on research and development will be concentrated in a few economic 
agents, of relatively large size, and, second: that the amount of expenditures 
in the production of technical knowledge will tend to be less than optimal. 
It is this last difficulty that makes it necessary for the state to 
intervene in order to give additional incentives to the production of tech­
nological knowledge, this being the first of the arguments currently used in 
order to show the need for a patent system. The patent creates a monopoly, 
and it is this monopoly that allows the inventor to reap full benefits from 
his inventive activity. 
(b) Patents as Incentive to Investment in T'!chnological Innovation. 
There is a large distance between invention and innovation, both in 
terms of resources and risks. Any invention that seems promising enough at 
the stage of its original conception must undergo a lengthy technical and 
economic manipulation in order to evolve into its experimental stage and 
finally into its actual utilization on an industrial scale. 
Such process--which normally implies a variety of resources-consuming 
activities such as applied experimentation, prototype constructions, pilot 
plant design and operation, engineering plant design, and so forth--also 
involves substantial risks. The empirical evidence suggests that, both invest­
ment and risk, are much greater in the stages of development of an invention 
than they are in the initial stage of its discovery. 1 
1See E. Mansfield, Research and Innovation in the Modern Corporation, 
Norton and Co., New York, 1971, Ch. 4. 
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In the same way as before, also here the prospect of an early 
imitation works as a disincentive for private entrepreneu~s 
to take the risk of innovation. The necessity arises, therefore, of an in­
strument of economic policy which could ensure the innovating firm that it 
will recoup its R&D expenses plus a premium for the risk which underlies 
the act of innovation. 
(c) Patents as Incentive for Inventors to Disclose their Inventions 
A third argument in defense of the Patent System stems from Rousseau's 
"Social Contract." In this case the patent is the expression of a contract 
between the inventor and society, contract th~ough which the former gives 
public status to the fruits of his inventive work, whereas in exchange the 
latter grants monopoly rights on the output of such inventive activity for 
a given number of years. /After this period has elapsed society can freely 
use the knowledge involved in the invention in question. 
It can be seen from the previous paragraphs that the three economic 
arguments in favor of patents imply the creation of a monopoly right. In 
the first case, as an incentive for the production of the right amount of 
technological knowledge; in the second one, as stimulus for the new know­
ledge to be developed up to the stage in which it can be effectively used in 
production, and finally, in the third case, as an incentive for the inventor 
not to keep secret the fruits of his inventive work. 
It l!ll.lSt be recognized, however, that the granting of monopoly rights 
to a given firm or individual has definite social costs, so that the optimal 
policy becomes a matter of evaluating social benefits against social costs 
in each particular situation. There is no reason to expect such balance to 
be the same among countries very different in their economic structure, or to 
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be the same in different industries within a country or, finally, to remain 
the same during different historical periods in the evolution of any given 
society. This argues against: (a) patent laws which are straightforward re­
productions of the ones conceived for other countries; (b) legislation that 
pretends to cover with an homogeneous rule the various industries of a given 
economic structure, or, finally (c) patent systems which have been kept 
unchanged through the economic history of any given society. 
The balance of social benefits and costs is not, however, easy to 
calculate in empirical terms. This is so, for various different reasons: 
first, a correct evaluation would have to isolate those inventions and innova­
tions that would not have occurred had we lacked patent protection~ from 
those other inventions which would have occurred anyway. From the net social 
benefit o.f the former (assuming it to be positive) we would have to substract 
the social costs of the latter. (Note that the social benefits of these 
last ones does not have to be included, as it would have been present even in 
the absence of patent protection.) 
Second, the social benefits arising from inventions and innovations 
that can be attributed to the patent system must be measured in terms of 
additional "consumer surplus." The following cases could be distinguished: 
(1) Launching a new product to the market: The consumer surplus 
will be somewhat positive, unless the monopolist can perfectly discriminate 
among buyers, and claim from each consumer the maximum demand price that he 
1
is willing to pay. 
1This case has been examined by D. Usher in "The Welfare Economics of 
Invention," Economica, (August 1964). 
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(2) Introduction of a new process in a monopolistic industry: the 
marginal cost curve of the monopolist will move down, and the intersection 
with the marginal income schedule will take place to the right of the initial 
equilibrium point, thus implying an increase in production, a reduction of 
price, and a subsequent increase in consumers' surpluses. 
(3) Introduction of a new process in a competitive industry: the 
innovator could gradually displace other producers, and this would give rise 
to a monopoly situation. The consumers' surplus would be positive, except 
in the case in which the new monopolist could perfectly discriminate among 
buyers. 
The foregoing examples show some of the difficulties that have to be 
taken into account when measuring social benefits and costs: Sunnnarizing, 
the following information seems to be needed: (1) Whether the innovation 
consists of a new product or of a new production process; (2) the degree of 
competitiveness prevailing in the industry before and after the innovation; 
(3) if the innovation would have happened even if patent protection were 
lacking; (4) the magnitude of the cost reduction that results from an inno­
vation in the production process; (5) the price elasticity of demand; 
(6) the proportion of the cost reduction which is actually passed to the con-
sumer, etc. 
Third, the picture does not look any better when we examine the other 
side of the equation, that is, the side of the social costs of the patent 
system. By creating monopoly situations the patent system has collateral 
effects upon the pattern of resources-allocation, upon income distribution, 
etc. Such collateral effects arise even if the monopolist does not indulge 
himself in what is called "abuse" of rights. It is said that the monopolist 
"abuses" of his rights when he attains a degree of monopoly which is larger 
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than the one the law originally choose to granto Obviously, when there is 
abuse, it has to be computed among the social costs of the patent system. 
F~ Machlup has quite clearly perceived the various difficulties in­
volved i.n the cost-benefit evaluation of the American Patent System. It is 
on account of that that he writes: 
"If one is not in a position to judge if a whole system (not 
specific pieces of it) is good or bad, the best thing to do 
is to recommend living on with it if that has been the way 
for some time during the past, or alternatively, to recommend 
its rejection if it has not been still tried. If we did not 
have a patent system, it would be irresponsible, on the basis 
of our actual knowledge, to recommend the institution of one 
now. But, given that we have had a patent system for so many 
years, it would be irresponsible, on basis of our actual know­
ledge, to recommend its abolition. This conclusion is referred 
to the U.S., and it certainly makes no sense for a small 
country or for a less industrialized country, in which the argu­
ments will have different weight and can, consequently, suggest 
a different solution. 111 
Machlup's last sentence certainly applies to the case of a country 
whose domestic "Inventive Activity" does not significantly contribute to the 
expansion of the world's technological frontier, and that does not qualify as 
a significant exporter of industrial goods. 
We will see later on that there are strong reasons to believe "a 
priori" that the benefits associated to the patent system will tend to be 
lower, and the costs higher~ in less industrialized economies, than in the com­
plex industrialized societies of the developed world. Before entering into such 
argument, it may be important to observe that the balance of benefits and costs 
in each individual country greatly depends on the international set of rules 
agreed upon by the Treaty of Paris, signed in 1883. Let us briefly look into 
the international set of rules before we consider in more detail the subject 
of costs and benefits for any given less developed society. 
1
F. Machlup, "An Economic Review of the Patent System," Government 
Printing Office, Washington, 1958, p. 79. 
-12-
2. The Paris Convention and the Extension of Patent Rights to the Inter-
national Scene 
There are four aspects which, from the point of view of the argument 
hereby developed, should be noted in the Paris Convention. They are: 
2.1 Equality of Treatment for Nationals and Foreigners 
Article 2 of the Treaty establishes that "The nationals of each one 
of the countries of the Union will enjoy, in the other countries members 
all of the advantages that the respective laws grant· to their own nationals." 
It is to be observed that this provision rejects the idea of re­
ciprocity of treatment to foreigners. In other words, it forces each of the> 
countries members of the Union to give all foreigners the same treatment 
given to nationals, and not identical treatment to the one its nationals
'get in each other's countries. 
2.2 Priority Rights 
Any person that has rightfully fulfilled the requirements for a 
patent, utility model, etc., in one of the Union's countries, will enjoy 
priority rights during the following twelve months (only six for brand names 
and models of industrial designs) in order to register the patent, utility 
model, etc. in any one of the other countries of the Union. 
The purpose of this article is to allow the owner of a patent to 
benefit from it on a world scale, if he wants to do so. For this to be 
possible, the eventuality had to be avoided that the first disclosure of the 
invention would destroy its novelty, thus blockading its patentability in 
other countries. By granting one year's priority to the inventor to re­
validate his patent in any one of the other countries of the union, this 
posibility is being discarded. 
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2.3 Cancellation of the Patent Because the Product is being Imported 
Article 5 of the Convention establishes that "The introduction, by 
the patent's titular, in the country where the patent was issued, of the 
respective product manufactured in another of the Union's countries, will 
not imply the forfeiture of the patent." The foregoing is restated in the 
following way: "When one product is introduced in one of the Union's countries 
where a patent exists that protects a process to manufacture a certain product, 
the patent's titular will have, respect to that particular product, all the 
rights that the country's legislation grants him on the basis of the patent 
given for the produ.ction of the article in that country." This article was 
conceived so as to grant the maximum possible flexibility to the patent's 
owner, as to where to manufacture the article in question. It is to be ob­
served that at this point the International Agreement clashes against what 
is being ruled in individual countries' legislations when they penalize the 
lack of domestic exploitation of the patent. (Such is, for example, the case 
of Argentina, which in article 47 of its patent law penalizes the non­
exploitation of the patent with its straightforward cancellation after two 
years of granted.) 
2.4Compulsory Licenses, 11 Legitimate Excuses," and the Forfeiture of 
Patents 
According to the Paris Convention the forfeiture of the patent is 
possible two years after the first compulsory license has been issued (art. 5); 
however, no compulsory license is to be granted before four years have elapsed 
since the deposit of the patent's application. And adds, in relation with the 
"legitimate excuses" argument, that a request for a compulsory license can be 
rejected if the owner of the patent justifies the non-exploitation of the 
patent with "legitimate excuses." 
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So much for the Paris Convention. We are now equipped with the tools 
necessary to review the problem of the costs and benefits of the patent system 
from the viewpoint of a less developed country, and to evaluate: (1) whether 
the arguments in favor of the granting of patents maintain their rationality, 
and (2) if the specific terms in which the International Convention has been 
conceived have positive or negative consequences from the point of view of a 
technologically dependent country. 
3. Patents and Less Developed Countries 
We shall now re-examine the foregoing arguments in relation to specific 
features of economic life usually found in less developed countries. Let us 
assume that the country we are looking at: 
(a) Operates with certain technological "lag," that ranges between 
five years and two decades, depending upon the industrial field which is being 
considered. 
(b) That the country imports from outside most of the productive 
technology that is put into operation. 
(c) It is expected that, for a good number of years, the country will 
not contribute to the expansion of the international technological frontier, 
having most of its local "inventive activity" addressed to the "adaptation" 
to the local circumstances, of technology which has been designed in the 
developed world. 
(d) The country is not specialized in industrial exports. Rather on 
the contrary, the bulk of its export trade is primary produce or simple manu­
factures (foodstuffs, etc.). 
As most of the Latin American countries display features such as the 
aforementioned ones, our arguments are specifically addressed to such countries. 
3.1. The "Patents-as-an-Incentive-to-Inventive-Activity" Argument 
The available empirical evidence shows that, in technology-generating 
countries, the number of patents can be ta.ken as one of the possible indexes 
of "Inventive Activity." Not very long ago J. Schmookler has shown that the 
statistical series of patents granted within the American economy is positively 
correlated both with the number of "technological workers," and with R&D 
d . 1expen 1 ture. 
At the light of such evidence Schmookler concludes that: "Given that 
more than 80% of the inter-industry differences in patenting activity in 1953 
are 'explained' by corresponding inter-industry differences in R. and D. ex­
penditure••• there is reason enough for us to use patents statistics as an 
indicator of inter-industry differences in inventive activity." 
A similar statement, however, would not make sense in the context of 
a less developed country. In such context patents granted to foreigners 
(multinational firms in its great majority) constitute a large and growing 
proportion of the total number of patents yearly issued. Table I below 
illustrates this point. 
1The correlation coefficient between patents and number of techno­
logical workers (scientists, engineers and qualified workers) was r = 0.83 
when working with 1950 data. The correlation coefficient between number of 
patents and R. and D. expenditures was r = 0.84 when using inter-industry 
data for 1953. See Schmookler, Invention and Economic Growth (Harvard Uni­
versity Press, 1966), Ch. 2. 
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1. India (a) 89.38% 
2. Turkey (a) 91.73% 
3. Ireland (a) 96.51% 
4. PeI'U (b) In 1960 95.20%
In 1970 97.45% 
s. Chile (c) In 1947 90.00%
In 1967 94.50% 
6. Argentina (d) In 1950 49.50%
In 1967 76.54% 
Sources: 
(a) The role of patents in the tr~nsfer of technology to the developingcountries. United Nations, New York 1964. 
(b) Pedro Leon Diaz: Analisis comparative de los contratos de licenciaen el grupo Andino. Mimeo, Lima 1971. 
(c) Patentes de invencion. Estudio estadistico preliminar. CONYCIT,Sgo.de Chile 1971. 
(d) Jorge Katz: Patentes, corporaciones multinacionales y tecnologia
Revista de Desarrollo Economico, Bs.As. April 1972. 
It is obvious that in countries such as those with which we are con­
cerned, the revalidation of foreign patents can not be taken as an indicator 
of domestic inventive activity. 
The argument of patents acting as an incentive to domestic inventive 
activity can not be put forward in defense of maintaining a Patent System in 
countries in which anything between three-fourth and 95% of the total ntUilber 
of patents yearly granted does not bear any relation whatsoever with the flow 
of domestic inventive activity. 
3.2 · The 'Incentive-to-the-diffusion-of-in~onnation' argument. 
Definitionally a less developed country operates with a certain time 
lag respect to world's technological trends, the majority of its products and/ 
or production processes being close replica of similar products and/or 
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processes used long before by developed nations. Empirical evidence gathered 
in a recent study reveals that the time lag--measured as the number of years 
that elapse between first world wide commercial usage of a product and/or 
process and its domestic utilization in the industrial sector of Argentina-­
goes from five to twenty years, the actual amplitude of the lag depending 
crucially on: a) Whether we are looking at a mechanical-engineering or a 
processing industry (electronics vs. chemicals, for example), b) On the 
absolute size of the domestic market as compared with the minimum economically 
feasible scale of plant, etc. 1 
It follows that, at the moment of its local utilization by a LDC, 
most 'new' products and/or production processes have already been publicly 
known on the international scenery for quite some time, being it possible to 
obtain the same amount of information as contained in the text of the patent 
at an almost insignificant cost (subscribing, for example, to the Gazette 
published by the US Bureau of Patents). It does not, therefore, seem to be 
correct to argue that LDC's have to grant patents to foreign firms in order 
to encourage and benefit from technoloeical disclosure. 
Like in the previous case, this argument can not be used in defense 
of maintaining a Patent System in relatively less developed societies. 
1The data referring to the time lag with which Argentine industries 
operate has been obtained by the present author in two samples, one correspond­
ing to the chemical industry and the other to the electronic industry. The 
data was obtained from questionnaires answered both by local firms and by
independent technologists. The results thus obtained are partially reported
in: Jorge Katz: Importacion de technologia, aprendizaje locale industrializacion 
CIE, Institute DiTella, 1971. 
P. Stubb, in a study concerning technological aspects of manufacturing
production in Australia, reports comparable information. See: Peter Stubb: 
Innovation and Growth. Australia National University, 1970. 
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Discarded the two aforementioned arguments, we are left with the argument of 
the patent system as an incentive to technological innovation. Given the 
high degree of complementarity that normally prevails between technological 
innovation and investment--in physical equipment, in product development, etc.-­
this last one really constitutes an argument for the granting of patents as 
an incentive to investment. In particular, as an incentive for the attraction 
of foreign capital. 
3.3 The 'Incentive-to-Investment-and-innovation11 argument. 
Strictly speaking, we should begin by differentiating here between 
cases of investment and innovation that are due to the patent system and those 
other cases in which the sequence investment-innovation would have taken place 
even without the incentive of a patent(s). 
Only cases of the first sort should be counted as part of the social 
benefits that any given society derives from maintaining a patent system. 
From a theoretical point of view, and in the framework of a perfect competitive 
situation in which governments abstain from using policy instruments to induce 
the flow of new investment, protection by means of patents might prove to be 
a significant stimulus. This is so because in such analitical framework 
perfect diffusion of information is assumed, as well as no barriers to new 
entry. Imitative competition can thus rapidly erode such monopolistic quasi­
rents as might develop as a consequence of a given time-lead in investment 
and innovation. In such a case, a system of patent protection could proof to 
be a strong policy instrument, operative in retarding competitive imitation 
and thus inducing the risk taking behaviour implied in the act of innovation. 
The actual world, however, is a far cry from such an extreme text-book 
image. On the one hand, markets are never perfectly competitive. Natural 
lags and leads arise in the difussion of information, and various economic 
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and extra-economic circumstances act blockading the fluid entrance of new 
producers to the market. On the other hand, governments normally interfere, 
strongly subsidizing investment and innovation in various different ways-­
sheltering new producers under tariff protection, granting tax-exemptions, 
admitting duty-free imports of parts and new equipment, and so forth. 
Policies of this sort insure high profitability to new investment, 
almost independently of entreprenurial performance. 
Both such reasons--government protection and natural lags and leads 
in the diffusion of information coupled with the existence of barriers to 
new entry--explain why the incremental degree of protection granted by a 
patent might constitute only a very marginal incentive to new investment. It 
is obvious that the effect of patents is not completely n~ll, but its incidence 
is of second order significance relatively to the previously mentioned variables. 
1 
It follows from the above reasoning that the social gains of having a 
patent system in a relatively less developed society, if positive at all, 
will probably be quite minute, as only in exceptional cases will the decision 
to invest and innovate depend on the incremental degree of monopoly power 
which results from holding an invention patent. 
Let us now take a look at the social costs that arise from maintaining 
a patent system in a less developed country. As we shall now show, these tend 
to be rather high and depend to a crucial extent upon previously mentioned 
provisions of the Treaty of Paris. 
1rt is to be expected that industries where the 'imitation lag' is 
small, and the number of potential imitators large, will tend to consider 
relatively more important the marginal increment in the degree of protection 
that can be obtained from holding a patent. About 60% of foreign patenting 
in Argentina corresponds to the pharmaceutical industry, which clearly meets 
such conditions. See: J. Katz La industria farmaceutica argentina. Mimeo, 
New Haven 1972. 
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3.4 The Treaty of Paris and the social costs of the patent system 
For reasons of symetry with the argument of the preceeding paragraphs 
we can not blame on the patent system all the social costs that arise from 
the high degree of oligopoly that frequently prevails in the manufacturing 
sector of LDCs. 
Small markets usually catered for by few large firms sheltered from 
external competition, are responsible for most of such costs, being it improper 
to blame the patent system for them. 
There are, however, specific circumstances in which the social costs 
of monopoly have to be entirely attributed to the Patent System. Such 
circumstances are related to what is normally called 'abuse of rights' from 
the part of the patent-holder, subject which we shall now examine. It is 
said that we are facing 'abuse of rights' from the part of the patent holder 
when he manages to achieve a higher degree of monopoly power than the one 
originally intended by the law. This happens both if he extends his monopoly 
power beyond the expected time-span of the patent, or if his monopolistic 
position covers a field of activity broader than the one specifically affected 
by his inventive activity. 
Several routes are feasible in order to attain either a larger time­
span of monopoly control than the one envisaged in the original patent, or to 
cover a field of activity broader than the one which effectively corresponds. 
Among other routes, the following should be mentioned: a. Incomplete 
disclosure of information in the text of the patent. b. Celebration of 
licensing agreements that go beyond the life of the patent. c. Making the 
text of the patent illegitimately ambiguous and broad. d. Signing cross­
licensing agreements, or 'patent-pooling' agreements. e. By 'supression' 
or non-exploitation of granted patents, etc. 
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Even though various of these forms of 'abuse' are frequent in practice, 
the last one--patent 'supression' or lack of local exploitation--is the most 
relevant from the point of view of our present argument. 
The subject of patent 'supression' is a complex one and has to be 
examined in at least three different levels. First, from the point of view 
of each country's own national legislation. Second, from the point of view 
of the Treaty of Paris, to which only some countries belong,and third· and 
final, from the point of view of the jurisprudence and judicial practices of 
each particular nation. 
Let us now examine the subject of patent supression in these three 
different levels in the case of Argentina. The Argentine Patent Law does not 
define in a precise way what the domestic exploitation of a patent actually 
means. It does, however, say that "A patent will lose its validity if after 
two years of its expedition it has not been exploited" (art. 4-7 of Law 111). 
In spite of the above, the Argentine jurisprudence has adopted in this 
area what we shall here consider as a~ approach to the problem of patent 
exploitation. From the proceedings of the court case filed by 'Quimica 
Estrella' (a local firm) against Ciba (a multinational drug company), we have 
extracted the following paragraph which clearly shows the views held by the 
main strands of nat·ional jurisprudence in this matters: "Breuer Moreno--
[one of the main national authorities in this respect]--when referring to the 
concept of patent exploitation, notices that it has not been defined by the 
law, and further adds that public consensus accepts the following interpreta­
tion which he considers to be reasonable: exploitation is not the same thing 
as local production, neither is it the same as local utilization. Therefore, 
in his views, it is neither just, nor is it reasonable to cancel a locally 
granted patent if theinventor is giving the necessary steps towards its 
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utilization, even though the actual industrial use of the patent has not yet 
materialized. ?hereafter he deems as reasonable the procedure usually 
followed, i.e.: the inventor advertizes in a professional newspaper, offering 
to grant a license on a specific patent". l 
Such doctrinnaire views are in complete agreement with the text and 
spirit of the Paris Convention, according to which the forfeiture of a patent 
because of its non-exploitation can not be deduced until after two years 
from the date in which the first 9ompulsory license has been granted on 
that patent. It should be remembered--as noted before--that according to the 
Paris Convention the first compulsory licensing can not be requested until 
four years have elapsed since the original patent application, and this only 
in the case in which no legitimate excuses can be advanced by the patent­
holder in order to justify his action. 
It is interesting to compare the above with the new legislative ideas 
contained in the Brazilian Law of 1969 and in the Peruvian one of 1971. Both 
these pieces of legislation present what we shall consider as a strong view with 
regards to the subject of patent exploitation. In so doing they introduced 
rules different from the ones agreed upon by the countries that join the 
Paris Agreement. 
The first of these two legal codes establishes that: "The patent 
holder must demonstrate the effective exploitation of the patent before three 
months following the third year of validity of the patent, and thereafter, 
before the third month of each successive year" (art. 59). It also establishes 
that: "The deathline for the exploitation of the patent, to the effect of 
1Poder Judicial de la Nacion, October 5th. 1970. Notes from the files 
of the case" Quimica Estrella vs. Ciba." (Unpublished). 
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granting compulsory licenses, will be two years after the date of concesion 
and one year afterwards, for the whole life of the patent" (Art. 42) 
The Peruvian Law goes even further in several aspects which we shall 
not deal with in this paper. As regarding theconcept of patent exploitation 
it establishes that: 
a. He who applies for a patent must submit a formal statement agreeing to 
initiate its local exploitation in ro more than two years. 
b. He is to infonn the relevant Government Office the- date in which the patent 
exploitation has actually began, requesting to be registered in the Record 
of Inventions under exploitation. 
It should be noted that both these laws reduce the time period fixed by 
the Paris Agreement for the concesion of compulsory licenses. Moreover, 
they introduce a new and important juridical figure, absent from the Argentine 
legislation. We refer to the 'reverse of the burden of proof' arrangement 
which implies that it is the patent-holder, and not a hypothetical domestic 
entrepreneur (which might not even exist at all), the one that has periodically 
to give evidence of the fact that the patent is being locally exploited. 
The Peruvian and Brazilian codes exhibit a much stronger legislative 
will of control than the one to be found in the Argentine legislation. In 
this case the legal path is in fact open for the owner of a patent to 'surpress' 
it from local utilization, covering instead the mere importation of the patented 
product. 
1see, E. Aracama Zorroaquin: Tendencias actuales de la propiedad in­
dustrial en America Latina. Revista del colegio de Abogados, Bs. As. 1972. 
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We shall now argue that there are at least two circumstances in which 
patent 'supression' generates social costs that have to be imputed to the 
patent system. Both of them become fairly significant in the socioeconomic 
structures with which this paper is centrally concerned. 
The first of these two cases arises in those situations in which a 
product is being imported not because of its local production being not 
feasible either on technical or economic grounds, but because a legal 
obstacle--represented by a patent--blockades local undertakings. Such case 
entails a distortion in resource allocation, whose social costs are to be 
charged on the patent system. 
A second case in ~hich the social costs of patent supression have to 
be imputed to the patent system arises when local subsidieries of multionational 
groups trade with associated companies--or with their respective mother 
companies--manipulating the 'accounting prices' at which such transactions 
take place. Price manipulation permits the generation and transfer of a flow 
of monopolistic rents which, from the point of view of the patent-granting 
country, has to be imputed to the patent system. 
Recent studies made in Colombia, Peru, Argentina, Mexico, etc. show 
that both such cases--price manipulation and distortion in resource allocation-­
are frequent events across Latin America. For example, after examining a 
sample of intermediate drugs presently imported by the Argentine pharmaceutical 
industry, approximately two thirds of which were protected by locally granted 
patents, we concluded that: "Even under conservative assumptions, the evidence 
just submitted supports the idea that from an overal import budget of around 
17 million US dollars, no less than 5 millions correspond.to transfers which 
derive from straight price manipulations. Thus, 'overpricing' of imported 
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drugs accounts for approximately 4% of the yearly value of sales". 1 
Recent studies by C. Vaitsos sug6est a similar pattern to prevail in 
some of the Andean Pact countries. He writes 
"The sample of pharmaceutical products hereby examined shows an over-invoicing 
of about 3 million US dollars. Approximately 50% of this figure should have 
actually gone to the government as taxes if it had been declared as net 
benefits by the Colombian subsidieries. Most of the remaining amount-­
probably up to 70% of it--would also have remained in the country because the 
local firms would have reached the maximum profit-remittance rates permitted 
by the law. 2 
And he further adds: 
"Another industry that we have examined outside Colombia was the electronic 
industry of Ecuador. After examining 29 intermediate products imported by 
Ecuador, we find that 16 of them were imported at prices comparable with 
those in Colombia, 7 exhibited over-invoicing of up to 75%, and the other six 
show rates of over-invoicing around 200%. Thus, the rate of over-pricing 
prevailing in Colombia has to be re-adjusted upwards when we consider the 
case of Ecuador. 3 
M. Wionzcek et. al. concluded, after studying the same topic in Mexico: 
11 In Mexico, like in other countries, royalty payments represent just a small 
fraction of the total cost of the received technology. Most of the actual 
cost comes from the rate of over-pricing that the Mexican subsidieries pay for 
1J. Katz: La industria farmaceutica Argentina. Es!ructura y comporta-
miento. Mimeo, Yale University, 1972. (To be published by Institute T. 
DiTella, Bs.As. Argentina.) 
2c. Vaitsos: The Use of economic power by transnational corporations. 
Doctoral Dissertation, Harvard University 1972. To be published by Oxford 
University Press, 1973. 
3Ibidem, c. Vaitsos, op. cit. 
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imported intermediate parts and products bought from their headquarters 
abroad. When the international prices are compared with the prices Mexico 
is paying for importing such inputs, differences are found similar to those 
reported by C. Vaitsos in Colombia. From 13 individual products we looked into, 
only one is imported at a price comparable to the international average. 
In three cases the rate of overinvoicing was found to be less that 100%, 
whereas in five other cases the rate was somewhere between 100% and 1000%, 
exceeding the 1000% mark in yet three other commodities. It is obvious that 
by this means large amounts are being transferred abroad, adding to the observed 
cost of the new technology. 1 
The foregoing paragraphs reflect the nature of one of the cases in which 
the patent system generates significant social costs for a LDC willing to 
comply with the internationally accepted rules concerning industrial property 
rights. 
The other case in which the patent system generates important social 
costs can be found in situations in which the complete substitution of imports 
is both, technically and economically feasible, but is actually blockaded by 
foreign-owned patents. Examples of this sort can be found, in the case of 
Argentina, by looking into the files of court cases such as: a) "Hoffman 
SA112La Roche and Co. vs. Roemmers , orb) "American Cyanamid vs. Unifa SA113 , 
or others of more recent vintage. Some of these cases combine both, blockage 
of domestic production and over-invoicing of the imported good, thus adding 
up two sources of social sub-optimization. 
1M. Wionzcek, G. Bueno and E.Navarrete: La transferencia internacional 
de tecnologia a nivel de empresas. Mimeo, Mexico, 1972. 
;see: Peder Ejecutivo Nacional, 18th June 1971. 
See: J.R. Vanosi: La proteccion constitucional y legal de patentes 
de productos farmaceuticos. La ley, February 16th. 1971. Also: M.A. Laquis, 
Indispensable reconsideracion de la ley 17.011. La Ley, August 1972. 
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We conclude here our examination of the social costs LDC's frequently 
have to face from maintaining relatively weak domestic patent systemsand, 
concomitantly, adhering to the Paris Convention. 
The following section closes the first part of this paper with three 
brief conclusions. The second part of this monograph examines the empirical 
evidence corresponding to the Argentine case during the Post-war period. 
Many of the arguments presented here in an a priori fashion, receive statistical 
support from the survey data to be examined. 
The balance of social costs and benefits of4. Conclusion of Part One: 
the patent system in a LDC. 
First, independently of what the balance of social costs and benefits 
of the patent system m~y appear to be in the context of a developed society1 
the previous discussion indicates that such balance willnecessarily figure 
out worse off in countries where not only the legislation, but also the local 
jurisprudence, have adopted a weak conception of what the meaning and purpose 
should be of locally exploiting domestic patents. This is so on account of 
the fact that the International Agreement facilitates the transfer of monopoly
 
rents from LDC towards those countries that generate and export scientific 
and technological knowledge. 
Second, there are reasons to believe that more than sound economic consi­
derations--based on the careful examination of social costs and gains--it is 
because of political reasons that LDC chose to maintain both, a weak domestic
 
patent law, and their membership to the Paris Convention. The foundation 
of the presidential decision of October 1966, through which the Argentine 
executive signed the formal incorporation of Argentina to the International 
It saysTreaty, constitutes enough evidence in support of this believe. 
"The Treaty of Paris offers the Argentine innovator and entrepreneurthere: 
undeniable possibilities for the promotion of exports and for the transfer 
- 28 -
of Argentine technology. It should be kept in mind that some of our exports 
--notably wine--have been facing difficulties in some foreign countries, because 
such countries did not recognized our national brands for our lack of membership 
to the Paris Agreement" •1 
In other words, recognizing that the Paris Agreement constitutes part 
of the legal framework which regulates the international trade of industrial 
goods and technology, the Argentine Government decided to put this country on 
a equal footing with more developed societies, assuming that in so doing the 
country was to derive net benefits. Not cons~deration was given to the clear 
inequality which characterizes the country's import and export flows of 
industrial goods. and technology, inequality which clearly generates a con~ 
comitant imbalance in the international distribution of the benefits resulting 
from joining the Treaty. 
Contrasting the lack qf economic analysis stands the political signifi­
cance of the Argentine adhesion to the Treaty, late in 1966. A new military 
government had just taken over the running of the country's affaires, and is 
at that point trying to re-establish a strong international image of economic 
stability and thorough respect for the accepted rules of the game regarding 
property rights. The obvious counterpart is the concomitant appeal to foreign 
businesses to invest in Argentina. 
Third, a strong legislative code--as for example the recent laws in Brazil, 
Colombia, Peru, etc. constitutes a necessary but not a sufficient condition to 
stop the patent system from producing adverse effects of the sort previously 
described. A fair operation of the system depends not only upon a major 
change in the written text of the Jaw, but also, and basically, upon a change 
in the spirit of the courts of justice which are responsible for the application 
of the law. 
1
Boletin Oficial de la Nacion, 10 de Octubre 1966. 
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Undoubtedly this last change is most difficult to attain, as it 
involves obvious clashes with vested economic interests, value judgments and 
p~econceptions regarding the type of society that is desired (both at the 
national level and in the international scenery), and other such aspects 
deeply rooted in the class structure of any given society. 
The next part of this paper explores in some detail the operation 
of the Argentine Patent System along the Post-War period. Some of the argu­
ments previously advanced receive empirical verification in the following 
sections of the monograph. 
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Empirical evidence regarding the operation of the patent system in a less 
developed society: the case of Argentina 1946-1970. 
5. Total number of patents granted and applied for during the post:war period. 
The performance of the Argentine Patent System has not been 
thoroughly examined up to the present. On account of this any empirical 
inquiry in the field necessarily had to start mom basics, assembling a 
preliminary body of statistical information upon which to base subsequent 
analysis. 
In the context of the present study such task was undertaken by, 
first, examining the available primary data from the National Bureau of 
Patents and, second, by carrying up two separate pieces of field work, 
one covering a sample of independent inventors which have been granted 
patents within the local framework, and the other one concerning a subset 
of multinational corporation,with systematic patenting activity in Argentina. 
Let us first look at the aggregate information corning up from 
the Bureau of Patents, leaving for further sections of this paper the 
discussion of the various different result which emerged from the two 
separate surveys mentioned before. 
5.1 Aggregate information concerning the application and granting of patents 
The National Bureau of Industrial Property (DNPI) publishes on a 
fornightly basis a Bulletin containing some basic information for each one 
of the patents that have just been'.granted~ The following features of 
each patent are consigned: a) Name and nationality of the patent holder, 
b) Number of the patent, c) Name of the invention, d) Number of years 
for which the patent has been granted and date from which its validity 
begins, e) Number of 'class' to which the patent belongs within the 
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classificatory records of the DNPI. 1 
Based en such information, and on data regarding patent application, 
obtained at the DNPI, we started by putting together two separate series, 
the first one describing the flow of patent applications and the second 
one corresponding to the total number of granted patents, over the period 
1949-1967. 
Such information provided the starting point of this inquiry. 
On its basis we then examined, first, the inter-temporal movement of both 
series and, second, the internal structure of the series for patents 
actually granted, particularly in relation to the unequal evolution of the 
patenting activity of private independent inventors vis a vis the patent­
ing activity of manufacturing firms. 
For this last purpose we made use of unpublished statistical 
2
information coming up from the Patent Office in Pirelli SA a manufactur-
1.It should be noted that the DNPI uses a universal classificatory 
code which is formed by around 300 'classes' and whose original design 
owes more to the aim of facilitating the scientific and technological search 
which needs to be done before granting the novelty of the invention, than 
to any other alternative objective more akin to our own present interests. 
From the point of view of its usefulness for the economics profession the 
DNPI classification has at least two major difficulties: a) Sometimes 
inventions are classified by taking into consideration the sector of 
origin of the invention and some other times by taking into consideration 
the sector of utilization of the invention. For example: an invention 
related to a harvester machine could sometime be entered into the class 
of 'machinery' (sector of origin) and yet in some other instances into 
the class of 'agriculture' (sector of utilization). b) In general any 
given class brings together inventions which correspond to very different 
sectors of utilization. For example: class 138 puts together medical 
instruments and vaccines. 
J. Schrnookler in his most thorough study of patents in the US faced 
similar difficulties. See his discussion of these problems in op. cit.: 
Chapter II. 
2Thanks are due to Mr. Plaza, Director of the Pirelli Patent Office. 
for letting us use his valuable and unpublished information. 
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ing firm which until recently compiled--in alphabetical order and by 
name of patent-holder--the list of the yearly granted patents. Assuming 
that those patents granted to names which did not carry any additional 
information such as SA, SRL, etc. belonged to individuals, and that 
the difference between such count and the total for any given year cor­
responded to patents granted to manufacturing enterprises, we were able 
to estimate the relative shares of both such groups. 
Furthermore, the annual flow of patents granted to industrial 
firms was then subdivided into two sectors; the first corresponding to 
enterprises with a systematic patenting activity within the country, and 
the second bringing together all those other firms which only 
sporadically apply for patents within Argentina. An annual flow of ten 
or more patents per year towards the end of the period under consideration 
was here used as the breaking point between the former and the later 
categories of firms. It is obvious that the previously described methodological 
sequence is not as 'clean' as one would have desired. It is based on two 
rather rough assumptions, whose validity we tried to explore during the 
course of our field work. Though both introduce some small amount of 
'noice' in the data, neither is sufficiently important as to demand more 
refinement at this level of aggregation. Table no. 2 and its corresponding 
Diagram show theresults obtained following the above-mentioned steps. 
Let us now examine these results, beginning by the series of Patent Applied 
for. Observe that: First, there is a small upwards trend in patent 
application all the way through. The trend line shows an yearly rate of 
growth in applications of just about 1%. Second, two cycles can be 
traced. From 1949 to 1953 we note a marked upwards trend which makes 
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the number of applications to increase by one third in a four-year period. 
By comparing with the curve corresponding to patents actually granted 
to individual inventors, we suggest that the rapid upward trend in 
applications from 1949 to 1953 is essentially due to the patenting 
activity of private inventors and not to patenting activity coming from 
manufacturing firms. 
Between 1953 and 1958 aggregate patenting activity faces a down­
wards movement~ there being a new, and fairly rapid increase, during 
the years 1958-1961. Contrary to what happened during the patenting 
boom of 1949-1953 the peak at the end of the 1960's was mainly related 
to the patenting activity of manufacturing firms (multinational corporations). 
It is our impression that these two cycles in patenting activity emerge 
from two quite different macroeconomic set of circumstances. The first 
of them ~949-l95J was mainly related to an increase in domestic inventive 
activity, particularly associated to the newly born capital goods industry 
which is growing under the stimulous of strong potective tariffs. The 
second boom, however, was much less related to domestic inventive activity 
and has to be seen as part of the overall marketing strategy of a large 
group of multinational corporation5massively investing in the country at 
the end of the 1960 1s. In relation to the series of Granted Patents, 
two comments can also be made: First, the number of patents granted to 
individual inventors loses absolute and relative weight over the period 
hereby considered. Whereas around 1950 independent inventors account 
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Table No. 2 
AEElication and Granting of Patents
194-9 - 1967
Total Number of
Number of Granted Patents granted to Patents Granted to Manufacturing Firms·Year Applications Patents individual inventors
(a) 
, Firms with Finns which
Total %/(a) Total %/(a) systematic %/(a) patent only %/(a)
2atenting Sporadically1949 5052 Q.482 2445· 54,56 2037· 45,44 477 10,65 1560 34,861950 5776 4170 2109 50,58 2061 41,42 321 7,70 1740 41,521951 6033 4313 2624 60,85 1689 39,15 267 6,20 1422 32,941952 6311 4975 2954 59,39 2021 40,61 340 6,85 1681 33,76. 1953 6601 4232 2646 62,54 ', 1586 37,46 350 8,29 1236 29,171954 6279 3906 2346 60,08 1560 39,92 315 8,09 1245 31,831955 5922 4630 2615 56,50 2015 43,50 542 11,71 1473 31,791956 6378 5248 3113 59,32 2135 40,68 955 18,20 1180 22,481957 5767 5051 2231 4W~l7 2820 55,83 1022 20,24 1798 35,591958 5663 lf643 215 8 46,50 2485 53,50 947 20,40 1138 33,091959 6919 4405 1908 43,32 2497 56,68 955 21,70 1542 34,97
1960 6803 4450 1982 44,56 2468 55 ,41l 877 19,71 1591 35,72
1961 7060 4144 1485 35,86 2658 64,14 849 20,49 1809 43,64
1962 6495 2947 1135 38,52 1812 61,48 525 17,84 1287 43,62
1963 6259 5881 2501 42,54 3380 67 ;·46 2348 39,94 1032 17,50
1964 6250 5264 1389 26,40 3875 73,60 HOl 38,12 1974 36,48
1965 6344 4127 1207 29,26 2920 71,74 1213 29,40 1707 42,34
1966 6786 5880 1531 26,38 4329 73,62 2206 37,53 2123 36,08
1967 6742 5733 1344 23,46 4389 76,54 2314 40,38 2075 36,16 









for around 55% of the total number of patents granted per year, at the 
end of the 1960 1s they scarcely passed the 23% mark. 
Such fall in the patenting activity of individual inventors can 
be explained by a host of events. Among others: 
a) The local picture is part of a world-wide trend originated in the growing 
technological complexity of the knowledge frontier, as well as to the 
increasing need of expensive experimental and testing equipment, research 
facilities, etc. Not withstanding the universality of the downward trend 
in the patenting activity of independent inventors, it should be noted 
that in the Argentine context such group is loosing ground more rapid 
than, for e~ainple, its counterpart in the US economy. J. Schmookler's 
figures clear~y bring out such situation: 
Table No. 3 Sources of Patenting in the US 
Patents granted Patents granted to
to individuals corporations 
1901-1906 81.4% 18.6% 
1956-1960 36.4% 63.6% 
Source: J. Schmookler: op. cit., pg. 26. 
b) The real cost of obtaining a patent increased quite considerably 
during the 1960 1s. Our figures indicate that relatively to a value of 
100 in 1960 the real cost of patenting went up to 248 by 1969. Caeteris 
paribus this might have discouraged further patenting from the part of 
independent inventors. 
Second, the patenting activity of manufacturing firms with ten or more 
patents per year increased quite considerably both in absolute and relative 
terms. While in 1949 this group accounted for only 10% of the total number 
of patents granted , in 1967 represented 40% of the total. The time 
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trend shows a rate· of growth of over 20% per annum, giving strong indica­
tion of its rapidly growing importance. All of the firms in this group 
are of foreign origin. Table 4 below gives account of the relative incidence 
by nationality 
Table 4 Nationality of the Foreign Firms with 'Systematic' Patenting
Activity in Argentina. 
COUNTRY OF ORIGIN NUMBER OF NUMBER OF 
FIRMS % PATENTS % 
U.S.A 47 59 1.208 52 
France '· 8 10 154 7 
Germany 6 1708 8 
England 6 1748 8 
Switzerland 4 2805 12 
Italy 3 4 35 1 
Holland 3 4 240 10 
Canada 2 2 53 2 
Source: Pirelli Platense, S.A. 
It should be noted that about 80 multinational firms belong in this 
category. The Table also points out that, though in absolute value the 
total amount of US patenting is definitely larger, the 'propensity' to 
patent might be greater in the case of Swiss and Dutch firms. This 
subject is more thoroughly examined later on in the monograph. 
Thus far we have looked at aggregate data. The analysis proceeds 
now at a more dissagregate level, looking first at the role private inventors 
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play in the domestic scenery and concentrating afterwards on the broader~ 
and somewhat more complex aspect, of the economic significance of foreign 
patenting. 
6. Patents and individual inventors 
Three fourth of the inventions that originate in Argentina come 
from the local comunity of independent inventors. If for no other reason 
than its statistical significance, individual inventors justify a clos·er 
examination. Questions such as what is the effective technological 
importance of their patents, and how many of them reach the stage of 
actual industrial utilization, immediately come to mind. Furthermore, 
given the fact that Argentina has recently signed its affiliation to the 
Paris Union·, it seems important to ask how many of the locally originated 
patents have been applied for in other Union-countries, thus throwing 
some light upon the problem of the social eosts and benefits associated 
to the country's affiliation to the Paris Agreement. These areas will 
be examined on the basis of direct information which was collected by 
means of a questionnaire distributed among a sample of individual inventors. 
To this subject we now turn. 
6.1 Features of the Sample 
Considering the fact that in 1967 a total of 1344 patents were 
granted to private individuals, we randomly selected 200 of them, that is, 
around 15% of the total. Even though in most cases the patent corresponded 
to just one single patent-holder, the sample of 200 patents left us with a 
. f 41 . llist o 2 inventors. 
1It can be thought at this point that the practice of certain firms 
patenting under the name of one or various of its employees, could bias in 
an upwards direction the relative importance of individual inventors. The 
fact that in our own sample such case occurred only once makes us believe 
that the practice is relatively infrequent in Argentina. J. Schmookler 
finds a fairly different pattern in the US contexr. 
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To such list we added the complete directory of names of the 
fifty five local inventors affiliated to the Argentine Society of Inventors, 
thus ending up with a sample of about 300 names. 
To each one of these people we did sent, through the mail, a 
questionnaire accompanied by an explanatory letter, describing the purpose 
of our study. The proportion of answers was rather low--just over 15% 
of the total number of formularies--which is not very much outside of the 
normal experience in surveys of this kind. The mail questionnaire was 
complemented with personal interviews to a fair number of the individuals 
of the list, making it possible to reconstruct 40 individual cases around 
which our exploration proceeded. 
6.2 Personal features of the local private inventor. 
Our modal age was localized between 41 and 50 years, and we shall 
be talking about a social character which in 95% of our cases completed 
primary school, only in 50% received high school training, and just in 
15% completed college edu~ation. 
The educational background of the 40 individuals hereby studied 
is sufficiently heterogeneous as to make it difficult to establish any 
reliable pattern. The group is formed by three engineers, one physician, 
one dentist, two business school graduates, etc. It is interesting to 
observe that approximately 25% of these individuals received some 
kind of technical education, if we define as such the one provided by 
technical high schools and faculties of engineering. 
We can compare these results with Schmookler's describing the 
north american inventor: 50% of his inventors are college graduate and 
61-64% can be included in what he defines as 'technologists'. It is 
somewhat difficult to make a straightforward comparison, as a US college 
graduate will pr~bably have more technical training than an Argentine 
,' 
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technical high school graduate, but less than a local engineer. Keeping 
in mind such difficulties, Table No. 5 summarizes the comparison: 
Table 5 Level of Education Attained by Inventors: U.S. and Argentina 
University 'Technologists'
graduates (*) 
Argentina 15% 25% 
United States 50% 61-64% 
(*) 'Technologists' is defined by Schmookler as including: engineers
chemists, heads of R&D Laboratories, etc. · In the Angentine context
we considered this group to be formed by university graduates and
technical high school graduates. 
Table-5 reveals that the level of technical education attained by 
the local community of independent inventors is significantly higher in 
the US context than in the Argentine one. On the face of such a result 
and taking into account the growing complexities of the contemporary 
knowledge frontier, it can scarcely come as a surprise the fact that the 
Argentine inventor seems to be loosing ground more rapidly than his 
north american counterpart. 
Before turning to the subject of inventive productivity in the 
sample hereby examined a few comments seem justified in relation to the 
'part-time' characteristic of the inventive activities performed by the 
Argentine inventors. 
Just about 50% of the sampled individuals happened to be working 
under a dependency relationship at the time of the survey. The other 
half of the sample corresponded to self-employed individuals. None of 
them, however, .could be classified as a full-time inventor, in Schmookler's 
-41-
sense (i.e., full-time hired inventor) 
To put it in different terms: the activity of invention is 
normally not being performed with full-time dedication, nor does it 
constitute an activity which is being performed under systematic contract 
with any given manufacturing firm. 
The difference between our results and Schmookler's in this area 
is quite startling. Approximately 40% of the inventors in Schmooker's 
sample seem permanently to be on the payroll of given manufacturing 
> 
enterprises: "A full-time dependent inventor is here defined as an 
individual who was hired to address all of his productive capacity to 
a research activity. Thus, a design engineer or a chemist working in 
research-'have been classified here as a full-time hired inventor"1(1) 
His 'full-time' inventors account for 40% of his sample, whereas they 
were almost non-existing in our own context. 
Inventive productivity 
The 40 Argentine inventors produced through their life time a 
total of 139 inventions ( aYailable on request ) , out of which 90 
received local patents, 2 were still under consideration by the Patent 
Bureau and the remaining 47 had not been patented. This means an 
average productivity of 3,5 inventions per individual, figure which 
goes down to about 2,3 when only patented inventions are taken into 
account. This is a subject on which the empirical evidence available 
for an international comparison is rather scanty. Art enquiry made by 
J. Rossman 2 in 1930 concluded that the average number of inventions in 
1J. Schmookler: op. cit., pg. 259. 
2J. Rossman: The Psychology of the Inventor: A Study of the Patentee 
Washington Inventors Publishing Co. 1931. 
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a sample of 710 north american inventors was 40 inventions per capita 
figure which suggests a rather low inventive productivity in the Argentine 
context.Rossman's figures, however, seem rather high and point out to the 
strong need of further research in this area. 
6.3 Interindustr,J Distribution and Quality of the Local Inventions 
a. Industrialization of granted patents 
Out of the 139 inventions generated by the sampled individuals, 
53 have been industrialized, if by that we mean the utilization of the 
invention in production runs, over and above 'the level of samples for 
selling or advertizing purposes. Patented inventions show a rate of 
utilization _which is marginally superior to the attained by non­one 
patented inventions. Thus, while 40% of the inventions in the first 
group reached the stage of industrial utilization, only 35% of the 
inventions in the second group did so. Both these figures look 
surprisingly similar to the ones F. Scherer and B. Sanders have shown 
to apply in the US context. (1) This subject is considered in some 
detail later on in the study. Obviously there are significant inter­
industry differences both in the distribution of patented and un­
patented inventions, and in the degree of utilization such inventions 
Table 6 below exhibits such difference: 
1The two more frequently mentioned studies on patent utilization 
in the US context are: a) F. Scherer et.al. ~Patents and the Corporation'
(Private edition, Boston 1958) and b) J. Rossman and B.S. Sanders: The 
patent utilization study in The Patent Trademark and Copyright Journal 
of Research and Education, Washington 1960. 
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Table 6 Interindustry differences in patenting by private inventors 
and in patent utilization by these same individuals 
Total Patented Non-patented Industri~~Non-indus-
lized trialized 
1. Foodstuffs 2 1 1 0 2 
2. Textiles 6 4 2 1 5 
3. Wood and furniture 8 7 1 3 5 
4. Pulp and paper 3 3 0 0 3 
s. Chemicals 4 >1 3 4 0 
6. Oil derivatives 1 0 1 0 1 
7. Stone, glass ••• 1 1 0 0 1 
1 
8. Metals 9 7 2 2 7 
9. Vehicles and Machinery 68 48 20 26 42 
10. Electrical equipment 33 14 19 16 17 
11. Miscellaneous 4 4 0 1 3 
TOTAL 139 90 49 53 86 
Source: Own survey 
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Table 6 reflects some interesting patterns. First, 73% of the 
inventions coming up from the sampled community of independent inventors 
is concentrated in two branches of manufacturing production: 49% in the 
Vehicles and Machinery Industry and 24% in the Electrical Industry. 
Second, the 'propensity' to apply for patents seems to differ quite 
considerably among industries. While 70% of the inventions in the vehicle 
industry were patented, only 40% of the inventions were so in the electrical 
IndustI""J. Third, between 40 and 50% of the inventions corresponding to 
either one of the two previously mentioned industries has been profitably 
exploited in production. Fourth, the large proportion of the inventions 
hereby considered corresponds to mechanical and engineering industries 
rather than to the 'process' industries, i.e. chemicals, petrochemicals, 
etc. 
b. Quality and Importance of the Inventions 
The list of 139 inventions produced by the sampled individuals was 
examined by a panel of local technologists. Though minor discrepancies 
emerged among the members of the panel, only 6% to 8% of the inventions 
under examination was considered to have significance and 'technological 
importance'. The local picutre does not seem to differ in this context 
from the one described by R. Nelson et. al. when they wrote: "Quite 
independently of the industrial branch under consideration the work of 
individual inventors seems to be of a different nature than the one 
carried out in the laboratories of the large corporation. Typically, it 
corresponds to small systems, or to non-integrated sections of large 
systems; the inventions they produce demand more mechanical ingenuity 
than a thorough knowledge of any given science. 1 
1R. Nelson, M. Peck and R. Kalanchek: Technology, Economic Growth 
and Public Policy. The Brookings Institution, Washington 1967. 
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6.4 Forces that Motivate the Act of Invention 
To what extent do inventors react to stimulous emerging from the 
demand side? Do they really 'feel' the underlying existence of a potential 
market for the outcome of their inventive activity? 
Acknowledging the difficulties envolved in answering questions of 
this sort, we did try to throw some light upon them by asking the inventors 
in our sample what did they reckoned to be the main stimulour inducing 
their inventive work. The following possibilities, among others, were 
suggested: 1) Vocation, 2) Previous and present readings on a given 
technological or scientific subject, 3) Day to day technical problems 
either in the household or in their jobs, etc. 
Only in 7 cases--out of 40--the vocational factor appears to be 
the only and sole detenninant of the inventive work. Instead, the need 
to cope with day to day technical difficulties, both in their homes or 
jobs, seems to be the underlying theme in most cases. A total of 26 
individuals made such items their first choice among the various 
possible alternatives, while yet 13 individuals indicated that "expected 
profits" were very much among their consideration when they had to 
select a topic for exploration and invention. On the whole, just under 
20% of the sampled individuals argue that mere 'vocation' is what directs 
their inventive work, being it possible to trace back considerations of 
potential demand and profits in the remaining 80% of the inventors 
hereby studied. 
6.5 Other General Results Emer~ing from th~ Study of Inventors 
First, besides being a part-time activity the act of invention 
seems to be--within the present sample--a highly individualistic one. 
Only 3--out of the 40 inventors under examination--worked with assistance, 
-46-
or sharing the project with collegues of a similar standing. 
Second, about 80% of the inventors lack research facilities, 
experimental equipment, etc. Tools are of a rudimentary nature. 
Third, only 8 individuals--out or 40--make use of scientific 
instruments, pilot plant facilities, etc. Of these only five could 
estimate the present value of their capital stock, providing us with a 
figure which, on average, oscilates between 1,000 and 1,500 US dollars. 
Fourth, It is important to observe that among the eight inventors 
that declared to have scientific instruments,, research facilities, etc. 
we find 6 of the 9 individuals that attained economic success out of 
their inventive work. This result seems to suggest that technical 
complexity and chance of economic success are not entirely divorced 
considerations. 
Fifth, defining as economically successful those individuals that 
at the time of the enquiry were receiving net revenue out of one or 
more of their inventions, a total of 9 individuals--that is, approximatel­
ly 25% of the full list--must be thought of as included in this group. 
This sub-set of inventors accounted for 54 inventions, that is, more than 
5 inventions per capita, clearly above the sample average; 43 of these 
inventions were under exploitation, making the rate of patent utiliza­
tion from this group significantly higher than the one for the sample as 
a whole. 
Sixth, only one--out of forty--individuals, had at some point made 
use of the Paris Treaty, applying for US patents after his original 
Argentine patent had been granted. 
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6.6 Brief Summary of the Results Obtained in the Study of Private Inventors 
Even though a sample of 40 individuals is certainly not large 
enough as to provide food for much generalization, we do believe that our 
results describe with some accuracy the social actor whose behaviour we 
are trying to understand, as well as his role within the domestic technological 
scenery. Let us briefly summarize our findings: 
1) There seems to be little doubt about the fact that local 
inventors are very poorly integrated with the expanding industrial system, 
and only play a very marginal role in the agvancement of domestic technology. 
2) Most of the flow of inventive activity coming up from local 
community of private inventors is concerned with mechanical and engineer-
/
ing fields, with very little concern for the 'process' industries (chemicals, 
etc.) 
3) About one-fourth of the sampled individuals attained some amount 
of economic success out of their inventive work. 
4) The large majority of the individuals seem to respond to forces 
emerging from the demand side, rather than to mere vocation. 
5) About 40% of the inventions reached the stage of industrial 
exploitation. The rate of patent exploitation is significantly higher 
for those individuals which achieved some degree of economic outsuccess 
of their inventive activity. Finally, 
6) World-wide application for Argentine-granted patents seems yet 
to be a very rare event, certainly one which can not be attributed 
significant economic value. In a-country in which the technological 
leadership is in the hands of foreign firms and in which the national 
industrial entrepreneurs lack interest and stimulous to absorb the risk 
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of innovation, the local community of private inventors has no alternative 
but to be marginated from the economic life of the society and gradually 
disappear into history. We conclude here our study of private inventors. 
The paper continues with the examination of the other major subset of 
patent-holders in Argentina, i.e. the multinational corporations with 
systematic patenting activity in the local scenery. 
7. Patents and Multinational Corporations 
Between 1949 and 1967 individual inventors lost more than 55% of 
their share in current patents granted by the _DNPI. Almost all of this 
loss has been absorbed by approximately 80 foreign firms which 
systematically apply for patents within Argentina.
'
Appendix N!l con~ains detailed infonnation about the.inter-temporal flow 
of patents. of these firms. It is this infonnation, as well as 
complementary evidence obtained during the course of a survey on patent 
exploitation, what we use along this section in or<ler to explore the 
economic significance of foreign patenting in Argentina. Let us first 
consider the inter-industry and inter-country distribution of both these 
firms and the patents they own in Argentina. 
7.1 Inter-Industry and Inter-Country Distribution of Foreign Patenting 
The 79 multinational firms with systematic patenting activity in 
the domestic scenery are thus distributed by nationality: 49 US firms, 
8 French, 7 German, 6 British, 4 Swiss, 3 Italian, 3 Dutch, and 2 Canadian. 
Table No. 7 reflects the relative participation of firms of different 
nationalit", as well as the absolute number of patents these firms were 
granted over the period 1957-1~67. The figures suggest a somewhat 
higher 'propensity' to patent on the side of the European firms, 




argued that this pattern is mainly associated to the kind of industries 
which Swiss and Dutch firms tend to operate, i.e. pharmaceutical and 
electrical products respectively. 
This observation leads us into the question of the inter-industry 
distribution of the patents under examination. In order to examine this 
question we proceeded in the following way: We first selected the month 
of each year in which the DNFI granted the maximum number of patents, 
over the period 1957-1967. Having done that we sampled at random around 
11% of the patents granted to all these firms over the same period, ending 
up with a list of around 1500 patents which were then re-classified by 
sector of utilization, using for such purpose the CIIU classes, at two 
digit level of aggregation. On thebasisof the data thus collected, and 
here presented in Table No. 8, the following observations can be made: 
First, about 80% of the patents granted to foreign firms with 
systematic patenting activity is concentrated in two branches of manufactur­
ing industry i.e. the Chemical industry and the Electrical Machinery and 
Appliances. The former one--mainly pharmaceutical patents--accounts for 
60% of the total number of patents grantedtomultinational corporations 
over the period under consideration. 
Second, Switzerland, Canada and Germany concentrate their patenting 
activity in the chemical sector. This reflects the large stock of patents 
owned by pharmaceutical laboratories such as Bayer, Merck, Schering, Ciba, 
1Roche, etc. 
½he subject of pharmaceutical patentings has been examined by the 
present author in La industria farmaceutica Argentina, CIE, Institute 
DiTella, Bs.As. 1973. 
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Third, the Dutch patenting activity is mainly associated to 
Machinery and Electrical equipment, result which reflects the incidence 
of Philips Gloielampenfabrieken. 
Fourth, the firms of Italian and French origin tend to concentrate 
their activities outside of the two fields previously mentioned. While 
the Italian firms are strong in the area of Non-matallic minerals, the. 
French ones are specialized in Machinery and non-electrical equipment and 
in the transport sector. Let us now explore the economic significance of 
foreign patenting in Argentina. 
7o2. Patents, Economic Theory and Less Developed Countries 
It is only in recent years, and due to the work of economists such 
as J. Schmookler, z. Griliches, C. B:CO.wnlee and others, that the economics 
profession has come up with a systematic body of theory concerning the role 
and significance of patents. 
Given the major differences which prevail between a technology­
generating country such as the u.s.--country studied by the previously men­
tioned authors--and a technology-importing country such as the one that 
concerns us here, it seemed to us proper to ask whether or not theory 
developed on the basis of the experience of the former could be applied to 
the later. 
For the purpose of examining this subject we have chosen a sample of 
12 foreign companies systematically applying for patents in Argentina, and 
in each case we have explored the statistical relationship between the flow 
of patents granted in Argentina to each mother company1 and the local perfor­





TABLE NO. 7 
Inter-Country Distribution of Foreign Patenting
(79 multinational firms with systematic patent-
ing activity in Argentina: 1957-1967) 
Germany Canada U.S.A. France Holland England Italy Switz. ITotal 
·,, 
Number of Firms 7 2 46 8 3 6 3 4 79 
Percentage over the
total of 79 firms in
the sample 8,9 2,5 58 8,1 3,8 7,6 3,8 5,1 100 
Number of patents
obtained between 1 I
VIand 1 993 224 7288 583 2087 734 282 1513 13704 t-'I 
Percentage over the total 
" 
of patents obtained hy
the 79 firms 7,2 1,6 53,2 l~ ,2 5 15,2 5,3 2,1 11,0 100 
TABLE No. 8 
Interindustry Distributing of Foreign Patenting 
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are: (1) gross sales, (2) gross benefits on sales, (3) relative share of 
the market, (4) annual flow of investment, etc. 
The firms thus examined are: Shell, Ford, Pirelli, Firestone, Good 
Year, Ducilo, Duperial, Union Carbide, Philips, Siemens, Citroen and Standard 
Electric. 
Our results do not reveal significant statistical association between 
the flow of granted patents, on the one hand, and either gross benefits 
on sales or relative share of the market, on the other. 
A different pattern prevailed when examining the statistical relation­
ship between the flow of granted patents and gross sales from the local 
>
subsidiary. Particularly when the later variable was lagged one or two 
periods, its degree of association with patents locally granted to the mother 
company became statistically significant in about two-thirds of the sample 
under examination. Table No. 9 exhibits the results obtained from esti­
mating by least squares, the following equation: 
Ln Pt= constant+ aLn vt, t-l, t-Z 
Where Pt refers to the total number of patents granted to the mother com­
pany, Vindicates sales and t represents time. 
Ei firms out of twelve--Ford, Firestone, Good Year, Ducilo, 
Duperial, Siemens, Citroen, and Standard Electric--exhibit a statistically 
significant relationship, particularly when gross sales are taken with a 
two year lag period. This result seems to uncover a statistical pattern 
difficult to attribute to just random circumstances. 
Having come up to this point, two questions seem justified: First, 
how do the present results compare with those reported by Schmookler, 
Griliches, etc. and, Second, what is their economic meaning? 
, ; 
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TABLE NO. 9 
Patents g,vanted to H~adque1rters ~nd looal sales of subsidien-ies. . 
CASE A: statistically significant results 
Specification 
of the lag Regression· Correlation 
Firm structure. coefficient Coefficient F-ratio t-Test 
Ford t-2 1.187* • 816* 7. 987 2. 82 
(O. 420) 
t-1 1. 229 • 730 5. 706 2. 39 
(O. 514) 
t 1. 312 • 709 6.071 2.46 
(O. 532) 
Firestone t-2 1. 979* • 963* 76.337 8. 37 
(0. 226) 
t-1 o. 609 • 327 o. 841 0.91 
(0. 604)
/ 
t 0.419 • 225 0.428 o. 65 
(O. 640) 
Good Year t-2 0.668* • 895* 24.186 4.91 
(0.139) 
t-1 0.181 • 232 0.400 0.63 
(0. 286) 
t 0.133 .170 o. 238 o.48 
(O. 274) 
Ducilo t-2 0.657* • 912* 29.550 5.436 
(0.120) 
t-1 0.411 • 754 9. 219 3. 036 
(0.135) 
t o. 270 • 524 3.042 1. 740 
(0.155) 
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CASE A: statistically significant results 
Specification 
of the lag Regression Correlation 
Firm structure. coefficient Coefficient F-ratio t-Test 
Duperial t-2 1. 359* • 863* 17. 591 4.19 
(0. 324) 
t-1 o. 993 • 685 6.189 2.48 
(0. 399) 
t o. 859 • 634 5. 378 2.31 
(0. 370) 
Siemens t-2 0.258** • 436 o. 938 1. 03 
(0. 250) 
t-1 o. 047 • 080 0.032 0.17 
(0. 263) 
t -o. 226 -. 334 o. 756 o. 86 
(0. 260) 
Standard t-2 1. 258* • 818 12. 182 3.49 
Electric (0. 360) 
t-1 o. 995 • 659 5. 391 2. 32 
(0. 428) 
t o. 762 • 522 3.000 1. 73 
(0. 440) 
Citroen t-2 o. 251* • 721 4.343 2. 08 
(0. 120) 
t-1 0.537 • 916 26.404 5.14 
(0. 104) 
t o. 751 • 942 47. 906 6.92 
(0. 108) · 
.. 
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CASE B: statistically non-significant results 
Firm 
Specification 





Coefficient F-ratio t-Test 
Shell t-2 0.04 
(1. 241) 
• 01 0.001 0.03 
t-1 1. 560 
(1. 482) 
.369 1.106 1. 05 
t 2. 46 
(1. 57) 
.485 2.468 1. 57 
Pirelli t-2 0.115 
(0.159) 














Union Carbide t-2 0.152 
(0.141) 
.474 1.163 1. 08 
t-1 o. 618 
(0.16 7) 
• 856 13. 730 3. 70 
t 0o 803 
(0o 132) 
• 927 36. 722 6.06 
Phillips t-2 o. 018 
(0. 079) 
• 095 o. 054 o. 23 
t-1 -o. 006 
(0.069) 
• 032 0.007 o. 09 
t 0.151 
(0. 092) 
• 500 2.671 1~ 63 
*Significant at 5% 
**Significant at 10% 
-58-
Consider the first question. By means of an inter-industry sample, 
and after estimating a regression equation similar to the one previously 
shown, Schmookler and Griliches report the following result: 
=constant+ 0.487 Ln Vt_ ·2 3 R = .88(0. 090) 
Observe now that our first eight results in Table No. 9 look fairly similar 
to the one attained by these authors working with a more aggregate set of 
data. Furthermore, also in our own results••• "there is a clear tenden_cy 
for the correlation coefficient to increase as lagged values of the inde­
pendent variable are considered." 
In order to tackle the second question let us first see what is the 
interpretation Schmookler and Griliches provide of their result. 
(a) Patents, Investment and Demand. A Theory of Inventive Activity 
in.Developed Societies 
From the previously mentioned group of economists, J. Schmookler is 
the one that more clearly has articulated facts and statistical evidence 
into a theory of inventive activity. From the last of his works--recently 
edited by z. Griliches1--we quote at length: 
Originally it appeared that the total inventive activity 
in the United States varied directly with economy-wide employ­
ment of labor and capital combined. This result supported the 
hypothesis that the potential saving in total cost constituted 
the source of prospective profit from inventing, that such poten­
tial saving would tend to be proportional to total cost of produc­
tion, and that therefore inventive activity would tend to vary 
with the total cost, that is, the volume of resources employed. 
This chain of reasoning later proved mistaken. Measures 
of the two were indeed highly correlated with a third variable--gross 
investment--and this appears now to have been the critical factor. 
1J. Schmookler, "Technical Change and the Law of Industrial Growth," 
in z. Griliches (ed.), Patents. Invention and Economic Change, Harvard 
University Press, 1972, p. 79. 
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This error was revealed once the statistics of patents 
classified by industry were available and patents in the rail­
road field were compared with an index of total out put in the 
railroad industry. No similarity such as that which had 
appeared earlier in the case of aggregate inventive activity 
and total national output emerged. Instead we found that 
railroad investment and railroad patents were very similar in 
their long run and shorter-run movements. The main difference 
,between them, was that the patent statistics lagged slightly 
behind those of investment••• 
Since this initial discovery we have checked for the 
existence of a similar relation between investment and inven­
tion in capital goods in a wide variety of industries. 
Wherever the economic data existed that relation has been 
found. That is, the ebb and flow of investment, or something 
associated with it, seems to produce a corresponding ebb 
and flow of inventive activity directed towards improving the 
capital goods••• 
Moreover, when we shifted from intertemporal comparisons 
within an industry to cross-section comparisons involving 
several industries at the same time, the same relation was ob­
served. Just as more inventive activity is devoted to improving 
an_industry's-equipment when more of that equipment is being 
produced, so more inventive activity is devoted towards im­
proving capital goods in those industries which are buying more 
equipment••• 
I think it is fair to say that these results are the complete 
reverse of a priori expectations for most of us would have ex­
pected investment to follow inventive activity, not to lead it. 
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The last of Schmookler's paragraphs should be viewed as a criticism 
of a thesis presented bys. Kuznets in 1930 and more recently by E.W.G. 
Salter in his Productivity and Technical Change. According to both these 
authors, output in any given industry tends to follow an S-shaped path over 
the long run, as the rate of growth eventually tends to decline. The fall 
in the rate of growth is induced by a fall in the rate of technical pro­
gress, which normally obtains when the industry's technology reaches a 
certain plateau of perfection. 
1J. Schmookler, "Technological Change and the Law of Industrial Growth," 
in z. Griliches (ed), Patents, Invention and Economic Change, Harvard Uni­
versity Press, 1972, pp. 74, 75 and 76. 
. :......:.. ·.,--' - -- ···~- . - -
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Objecting such view of the world, Schmookler writes: 
The evidence referred to above suggests that these 
analysis largely reversed cause and effect. The rate of 
growth of an industry has probably a greater effect on the 
rate of growth of the technology associated with it than the 
other way round. (At least this is so unless further research 
reveals an exceedingly perverse variation in the economic 
quality of the inventions made in an industry in different 
times). For what Kuznets took to be evidence that an industry's
inventive potential was being played out--the decline in the 
number of inventions made in it--now distinctly appears to be 
a consequence of a decline in the market for inventions, which 
is a corrollary of declining investment in the field. This 
interpretation seems indisputable in the face of the marked 
tendency of investment to lead invention on capital goods in 
any given industry. 
And he further adds: 
If we assume, as seems reasonable, that some form of the 
acceleration principle governs the rate of investment in an 
industry, then the line of causality seems to run from the in­
dustry's rate of growth to its rate of investment to its rate of 
technolqgical proress to price changes and back to the rate of 
growth of output. 
Summarizing, Schmookler 1 s theory states that the correlation between 
patents and output stems from the fact that both such variables are corre­
lated with the rate of investment. Th.us, the flow of inventive activity-­
which in his framework is represented by the flow of patents--becomes an 
endogenous variable, follows the path of gross investment and, as this 
one, tends to reflect demand expectations. 
Is there any reason to believe that such conceptual structure can be 
used in order to throw some light upon the economic role of patents in the 
context of Argentina? To such question we now turn. 
(b) Patents, demand and imports. An alternative interpretation of 
the role of patents in less developed societies 
Two different reasons suggest that Schmookler's theory does not readily 
apply in the specific case we are here exploring. 
1J. Schmookler, rrTechnical Change and the law of Industrial Growth," 
2.P.• cit. , pp. 78, 79. 
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On the one hand, and this we already know from previous sections of 
the paper, patents granted by Argentina to the head officies of multi­
national groups with active local subsidiaries can not be taken as an in­
dication of domestic inventive activity. We can not really argue that 
in this alternative context the flow of patents allows us to build a theory 
of inventive activity. 
On the other hand, and as it will be shown in this section, a very 
large fraction of the patents locally granted to foreign finn.s are not· 
effectively used in production. Instead, they become an instrument for 
market control, while the patented product is being imported either from 
the company's headquarters or from any one of the various subsidiaries from 
the group. 
Before actually considering the empirical evidence which supports the 
previous statement, let us examine the relationship between patents and 
gross investment, as such relationship will become an integral part of 
the alternative interpretation we shall hereby advance as to the economic 
role of patents in LDCs. 
b.l Patents and Gross Investment 
Corroborating Schmookler's findings, our own data reflects a signi­
ficant degree of association between the flow of granted patents and the 
flow of gross investment. Diagrams 2 through 5 exhibit the relationship 
between both series at the firm level, in two firms of the pharmaceutical 
industry and two other firms from the electrical industry, clearly the more 
important branches of manufacturing production as far as the granting of 
patents is concerned. Similar evidence is available for various other 
firms. Statistically speaking, therefore, our data confirms much of 
I' ...... Diagram 2
I ' ......
I . ' Patents giranted to the mother companyI ',
I ' and investment of the local subsidiery.\
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Diagram 5 
Patents granted to the mother company
and investment from the local su0sidiery 
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Schmookler's findings. We do not feel, however, that such statistical 
similarities constitute a sufficient condition to make the theory stand in 
the case of Argentina. Let us consider our reason for so thinking. 
Within the analytical framework employed by Schmookler, the possi­
bility of patents being used to protect an import market just did not con­
stitute an interesting research avenue and was hence left completely unex­
plored. We believe that such omitted alternative becomes the crux of the 
matter in the context of less developed countries, and it is this that 
precludes a straightforward utilization of received theory. 
For the purpose of examining this central point we carried up a 
statistical survey on patent utilization, whose methodological steps 
where the following: to each one of the 80 international firms with 
systematic patenting activity in Argentina we send, by way of the mail, 
a first very short questionnaire with the purpose of knowing whether the 
local subsidiary had any participation at all in the selection of the patents 
each mother company eventually applied for within Argentina, or if the 
decision as to number and type of patents to be locally applied for, re­
mained entirely a headquarters responsibility without much say from the 
local bureaucracy. 
Approximately 50% of the answers fell in each one of these two 
subgroups, thus leaving us with a new sample of around 35 firms in which 
additional infonnation concerning their patent policy could be asked at 
the level of the local subsidiary. 
A second questionnaire was at that point designed, inquiring in some 
detail about the local utilization of a specific sample of patents randomly 
drawn from the overall stock of patents owned by each multinational group 
locally. 
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Considering the controversial nature of some of our questions the 
fact that we got 12 questionnaires back, containing very detailed informa­
\ 
tion about 102 patents, is not altogether discouraging. The firms ans­
wering our second questionnaire are: American Cynamid, Elli Lilly, Merck 
A:, IBM, Siemens, Sandoz, Lepetit, Xerox, Standard Electric, Minnesota 
Mining and Manufacturing, Firestone, and Pilkington Bros. These firms 
account for a stock of 2500 patents accumulated over the period 1957-1967, 
is just about 20% of the total number of patents granted over the 
same period of ti.me to the 80 multinational corporations with systematic 
patenting activity in Argentina. 
Table No. 10 summarizes our results. Out of 102 patents for which 
we have detailed information, only 15 were actually under exploitation at 
the ti.me of the survey (or had been exploited in the past); 29 covered 
current imports; and the remaining 58 patents were not under present ex­
ploitation, neither were they covering present imports. A certain fraction 
of those 
'" 
58 patents were "abandoned, 11 i.e. maintenance fee had not been paid 
regularly to keep them "active," while yet another fraction was presently 
being kept active either for future utilization or for the protection of 
future imports. 
Table No. 10 
Patent Utilization Within Argentina 
(sample of 12 firms and 102 patents) 
Number of patents 
1. Locally exploited in production 15 patents 
2. Covering present imports 29 II 
3. Not being presently used in produc­
tion neither being the product 
imported 58 II 
Source: own survey 
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Two major features emerge from these results. First, local utiliza-
tion of foreign patents is rather small. This is clearly seen when we 
compare the previous figures with data for the U.S. economy. J. Schmookler, 
employing data collected in a statistical survey by B. Sanders, 1 argues 
that around 56% of the U.So granted patents are connnercially exploited, 
while F. W. Scherer in an independent piece of research carried out at
\
Harvard's Business School in the late 1950s arrived a~ a fairly similar 
result--54% of the patents sampled for the study were found to reach the 
stage of economic exploitation. 2 
Second, quite apart from the previous finding, the role of patents as 
instruments for the protection of an import trade is also quite apparent in 
our data. In this respect the economic value of patents locally granted 
to multinational corporations greatly depends upon the judicial interpre­
tation of Article 5 of the Paris Convention, a subject with which we had 
dealt at length in previous parts of this monograph. (See pp. 26ff, our 
comment about recent court cases in which the local courts regarded the 
importation of a product as sufficient local exploitation of a granted 
patent.) 
Putting together the various different threads of the empirical 
evidence uncovered by our research, the following picture seems to emerge: 
import-substitution industrialization, strongly encouraged by Argentina 
in the whole post-war period, and particularly since the middle 1950s, 
has often meant the expansion of poorly integrated industries that normally 
started local production with a very high rate of import content, in terms 
of raw materials, parts, and so forth. In such conditions the local 
1B. Sanders, "Patterns of Connnercial Exploitation of Patented Inven­tions by Large and Small Companies," Patent, Trademark and Copyright Journal,Spring, 1964. 
2
F. M. Scherer, et al., ,rPatents and the Corporation," privateedition, (mimeo, Mass.1959). 
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patent system was called on to p
lay a role that nowhere resemble
s the role 
the patent system played in more
 developed societies. Whereas i
n the later 
it acted as the provider of an i
ncentive to inventive activity, 
in the 
fonner it merely supported the o
verall investment strategy of m
ulti­
national finns which started loc
al operation with very low verti
cal inte­
gration. 
In other words, our present alte
rnative hypothesis suggests tha
t in 
the context of less developed so
cieties embarqued in domesti~ im
port-substi~ 
tution-industrialization program
s, the patent system has only ac
ted as an 
instrument for market control, l
acking many of the basic feature
s that 
allowed economists of the develo
ped world to examine its role in
 the 
context of the theory of inventi
ve activity. 
The Main Results of the Statisti
cal Study of Patents in Argentin
a
8. 
Along the post-war period Argen
tina has annually granted around
(a) 
A very low upwards trend can be 
observed in the series for 
6,000 patents. 
Granted Patents. 
(b) Local individual inventors 
have fallen quite dramatically i
n 
their share of the total amount 
of patents yearly granted. Duri
ng the early 
1950s they accounted for about 6
0% of the total number of paten
ts annually 
granted, their share being a me
re 20% by the end of the 1960s. 
The local inventors hereby studi
ed exhibit a low level of tech­
(c) 
Only 15% of our sampled individu
als achieved a university
nical training. 
degree, as compared with about 5
0% in Schmookler's studies abou
t the U.S. 
community of private inventors. 
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(d) Inventive productivity seems also to be very low in our ownsample, coming up to just about 4 inventions per capita. Again this figureis rather low by U.S. standards. 
(e) Approximately 75% of the patents granted to individual inventorscorrespond to two mechanical industries; vehicles and non-electricalmachinery and electrical machinery and appliances.
(f) Nearly 40% of the inventions for the vehicles and non-electricalmachinery industry reached the stage of industrialization, whereas justabout 50% of the inventions to the electrical machinery industry did so.(g) Mos.t of the inventions coming up from independent inventorscorrespond to areas which demand a very small amount of scientific know­ledge; instead, they do demand a great deal of mechanical skills and in­genuity. Process industries are not very much within. the concern of privateinventors. 
(h) In approximately 80% of the individuals hereby sampled we ob­served a clear answer to market incentives as major detenninants of theirinventive work. Only 20% of them seemed to be motivated almost exclusivelyby vocational elements. 
(i) About 1/4 of the individuals in the sample attained economicsuccess out of their inventive activity. 
(j) The lack of a meaningful relationship between independent in­ventors and manufacturing industry is notorious and fairly different fromthe picture that prevails in more developed societies. "Hired inventors"are just not to be found in the domestic environment.
(k) Only one of our sampled individuals thought it rather convenientto make use of Argentina's affiliation to the Paris Convention and applyin other member countries for Argentine-granted patents. In other words, theCountry's membership to the Paris Agreement can not be justified in termsof the economic quid pro quo derived from such membership. 
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(1) Between 75% and 80% of the total number of patents yearly granted 
are owned by approximately 80 multinational corporations with systematic 
patenting activity in the local scenary. 
(m) Nearly half of the foreign patents locally applied for, belong 
to U.S. finns, Switzerland and Holland follow. in relative importance, 
with about 10% each. 
(n) Nearly 80% of the foreign patents locally applied for1 correspond 
to two branches of manufacturing production: chemical products (which is 
mainly pharmaceutical items) and electrical products. The first industry 
accounts for nearly 60% and the second one for yet another 20% of the stock 
of foreign patents accumulated over the period 1957-1967. 
(o) Foreign-owned patents seem to be statistically correlated with 
, 
the sales performance of the respective local subsidiaries. Furthermore, 
such flow of patents also seems to be highly correlated with the flow of 
gross investment. Both such statistical relationships very much reseinble 
findings previously reported in the economics literature by authors such 
as Schmookler, Griliches, and others. 
(p) While in the case of these authors the flow of patents can be 
interpreted as an index of local inventive activity and therefore provides 
important empirical evidence for the construction of a theory of innova­
tion, it is argued here that in LDCs patents play an entirely different 
role and can not be approached in terms of received theory, which mostly 
reflects the U.S. experience. 
(q) Approximately 1/3 of the patents studied during the course of a 
survey among foreign patentees had the purpose of protecting an import 
market presently supplied either from headquarters or from any one of the 
various members of a transnational group. 
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(r) Just about 16% of the patents examined in our survey of patent 
utilization were under present local utilization or had been so at some point 
in the past. Such figure compares very badly with available evidence for 
the U.S. in which rates of utilization of the order of 54%-56% have been 
found by B. Sanders, E. M. Scherer and others. 
(s) The mere importation of a patented product produces social costs 
of at least two different kinds, which have to be entirely blamed on the 
patent system and the Treaty of Paris. The first of these social costs 
appears when the complete substitution of imports is both economically and 
technically feasible, but is blocaded by the two. previously mentioned legal 
institutions. A large array of recent court cases for patent violation 
exactly reveals the nature of this case in the Argentine context. 
The second group of social costs is related to the various forms of 
price manipulations which can be found to prevail in the import trade of 
multinational groups. Particularly important in this respect is the 
pharmaceutical industry in which the protection through patents of a broad 
spectrum of specific intennediate markets for active chemicals allows a 
widespread array of restricted practices of the sort hereby mentioned. 
Our findings are far from being optimistic. If we are to judge by 
the evidence submitted in this monograph, neither the affiliation of 
Argentina to the Paris Convention, nor its maintenance of a weak domestic 
legislation concerning the granting and domestic exploitation of foreign 
patents, appear to be policy decisions that can be defended on the basis 
of a straightforward economic cost benefit analysis. 1 
1This view obviously implies a certain time dimension. As long as 
the country remains a marginal exporter of industrial goods, and as long 
as its domestic flow of inventive activity has second order importance in 
the international scenery, there does not seem to be much to be gained by
joining the Paris Convention. Clearly our policy suggestion would be 
different if those basic limitations are at some point overcome. Various 
different developed countries have at different points in their histories 
violated internationally agreed rules of the game, only to become strong
supporters of the status quo after their specific and individual disadvantages
had been overcome. 
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To continue as a member of the Paris Convention when, for some time 
to come, the domestic flow of inventive activity is not yet strong enough 
as to collect the benefits of the country's affiliation, while the social 
costs of membership are self-evident, can hardly be advocated as being 
a choice based on the "national interest." To maintain the present legis­
lation (and·judicial practices) with a very weak conception of what 
the meaning and purpose should pe of locally exploiting foreign patents, 
also seems hardly justifiable on strictly economic grounds. 
These conclusions, however, by no means imply that the present 
author rejects· the need of appropriate legislation to induce the production 
of new knowledge, neither do they imply lack of recogn~tion of the fact 
that an· adequate rate of return should be allowed in order to encourage 
invention, innovation and international diffusion of technology. 
However, there where legislation which is a straightforward imitation 
of legal codes prevailing in more developed societies, fails to achieve 
its basic social objectives, and ends up causing more harm than benefits, 
a more flexible mechanism of bilateral negotiation between the host 
government and multinational enterprisescould possibly bridge the gap 
and generate social benefits, even within the framework of oligopolistic 
or monopolistic situations. 
It is obvious, however, that bilateral negotiations such as those 
advocated here should go well beyond the subject of patents, as this is 
just only--and a very marginal one--of the topics which require basic 
change in the social and economic life of LDCs. 
AP.I?,endix N 1 
Patents yearly granted in Argentina
to multinational firms'with systema
tic patenting activity. 1957-1967, 
1957 1958 1959 1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 ·1966 1967 Total,. 
, IAmerican Aniline Products (USA) ·· ·· · - - ... - - - - ·- - - 13 13American Cynamid Company (USA) 16 18 38 25 26 14 20 22 9 16 42 246
Allied Chemical Corp. (USA) .. 1- - 2 4 ·6 11 29 22 46 16
Abbot Laboratories (USAO 1371 -.._J4 3 8 9 9 6 14 17 12 1S 14 111 ~ 
I 
IAlu::ninium Laboratories Ltd. (Canada) . - . - 5 4 1 1 ... - - - 11 22
Badische Anilin y Soda Fabrik (Alemania) 2 3 7 - ·S 1 10 12 11 - 22 73
Beecham Group Ltd. (Inglaterra) - - - - - - - - - - 11 11
Borg-Wagner Corp. (USA) 3. s 2 .. 9 ·4 6 12 - - 33 74
C.A.V. Ltd. (USA) - - . - ··- 11 10 20 10 - - 12 63
Ciba S.A. (Suiza) S7 60 77 S1 S3 .. 33 1S2 130 •. .58 67 88 826
Commissariat a l'Energie Atomique (Fran.) - 4 3 - 9 4 14 . 12 12 21 13 92
Continental Carbon Co. (USA) - - - 2 - - 7 - - - 10 19
Corning Glass Works (USA) s s 6 8 8 2 4 s 3 12 13 71
IDeere & Co. (USA) - - - - 1 - 1 - - 14 14 JO
Deutsche Gold und Silber Scheideaus (Alem.) 4 - s. 3 8 9 17 6 7 9 10. 78
Dow Cor;;dng Corp. (USA) s 1 .......... .. 1 - 4 12 31 11 33 17 115
Du Pont E.I. de·Nemours &Co. (USA) .. :54•\ I ~52'; - ·59 ·; .,45 .' 23· ·12 S6 4 48 35. 117'' 11s • · .S7?_i 
' ' ! 
1957 1958 1959 1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 Total -. 
Eastman Kodak Co. (USA) . ~ ... 1 3 4 .3 ·l ·6 11 11 24 45 109 
Eaton Yale & Tot.me Inc. (USA)· 1 1 1 3 8 4 20 38 
Eli Lilly Co. (USA) 1 4 2 2 · l 2 5 8 4 6 25 60 
Etablissements Kuhlmann (Francia) · -- ... 6 4 12 22 
F.M.C. Corp (USA) ·8 20 21 6 11 29 95 
Farbwerke Hoechst A.G. (Alemania) 6 5 .:.7 · 10 10 · · 4 ·8 19 18 31 52 170 
Farbenfabriken Bayer A.G~ (Alemnnia) ·•. •·· 22 27 26 · 11-, 25 ·21 ·34 51 ; 21 31 44 313 
Ford Motor Co. (USA) - - 1 1 
I 
8 3 2 16 20 5f· 
Geigy J.R. S.A. (Suiza) 9· 9 26 - 25 18 28 12 19 41 ~4 251 
General Electric (USA) 46 27 28 54 33 19 · 30 , 34 16 26 38 351 
Girling Ltd. (Inglaterra) 
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Ualcon International Inc. (USA) ... 1 11 10 20 19 61 
Hoffman La Roche & Cia. (Suizn) 34 23 28 32 28 16 ·17 25 · 27 50 116 396 
Imperial Chemical Ind~ (Inglateira) 24 36 41 24 27 10 46 :50 51 103 87 499 
Institut Francais de Petrole des Carburants ~-- .... 23 10 33 
Standard Electric Corp. (USA) 

























Leesona Corp. (USA) 
Lepetit S.p.A. (Italia) 
Libbey OYen •Ford GlaBS (USA) 
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Merck & Co. Inc. (USA) 21 22 28 37. 19 14 24 22 41 52Monsanto Co. (USA) 56 
Midlarid Ross Co. (USA) 
9 6 1 6 ·4 - 16 20 '1,7 163 105 
Miles Laboratories Inc. (USA)· 
- - - - - - - 2 12
1 1 5 7 6 
j ~ 10 10 14 . :4 8 10Minnesota Mining & Manufacturing·Co.(USA) 18 8 ·7 6 15 7 16 27 10 19 26Modern Telephone S.R.L. (USA)· - - - .










- . 7 20Motorola Inc. {USA) 
' 
Olin Mathieson Chemical Corp~· (USA) 
- - - - - - 3 - 12 15
23 19 14 19 22 13 17 41 31 11 13Parke Davis & Co. (USA) 13 3 25 9 7 ,3 12 13 15 6 20Philip Morris Inc. (USA) 
Philips Gloeilampenfabrieken {Holanda)·· 
- 1 1 ' - - - 3 1 1 8 10
122· 95 99 204 133 · 73 158 188 106 123 171Pilkington Brothers Ltd~· (Inglaterra) · 3 1 
. 
Pirelli S.p.A. (Italia) 23
-
















Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co. (USA) 41 20 14 9 8 ·3 18 27 9 32 21Radio Corporation of America (USA) 122 95 99 204 133 73 158 128 22 41 33Regie Nationale'dcs·Usines·Renault (Fr.)· ... - . 
I 
- . l . ·8 16 15 . 7 - 14 18Rohm & Haas Co. (USA) \ 14 7 •6 11 20 11 35 34 21 50 21
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I Si!ndoz Patents Ltd. (Canada) 4 10 17 26 20 - ·1 26 19 37 42 202 
I 
Stamicarbon N.V. (Holanda) 
Stauffer Chemical Co. (USA) 





























, Shell Ind. (Holanda) 
I 
Scher:i.ng A.G. (Alemania) 
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Scherico Ltd. (Suiza) - - 3 ·4 ,, l 3 4 8 2 3 12 40 
Squibb E.R. (USA) - 2 .;. l - 1 l - - 1 16 22 
Siemens A.G. (Alemania)
ISnia Vis cos a S .N. I.A. (Italia) 
j
I S .A. Andre Citroen (Francia) 
i The Bendix Corp. (USA) 


































































The Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co·. (USA) ;., 31 12 20 14 4 ·7 42 24 17 18 22 211 
The National Cash Register Co. 





























The Well.come Foundation Ltd. (USA) 
,. - . ... - .. - s 3 - - 7 16 31 
United States Rubber Co. (USA) 
Union Carbide Corp. (USA) 












































'...~ ~- . .., ... . , . . "i.I :. ,· ·• : . } ';• ~ .; : 
. • i 
,,. ·-
